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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
pay the expenses of litigation in order to recover that amount fraudu-
lently taken from him, while a cheat is permitted to go unpunished.
In view of the purpose for which punitive damages are assessed, and
the fact that the plaintiff has a right to be made whole, it appears that
the courts of California and the District of Columbia have adopted the
best view, which more nearly meets the purposes of damages in tort
actions. These jurisdictions apply the "out of pocket" rule for the
measure of damages, 19 and authorize the submission of the issue of
punitive damages to the jury where the plaintiff's evidence tends to show
actionable fraud. 20  By applying this rule the sum wrongfully obtained
will be returned to the plaintiff, and the jury may, in its discretion,
punish the defendant to the degree that the facts of each case warrant.
And by virtue of this punishment, the plaintiff may receive the ex-
penses he incurred in litigation.
From the propositions discussed above, it is concluded that where
the "out of pocket" rule is not applied and punitive damages are not
allowable upon showing actionable fraud, the perpetrator in too many
cases has nothing to lose by his fraud. He stands the chance of making
a dishonest profit if his scheme is successful, but in no event can he lose
by his misconduct. The unfairness of such a result is vividly illustrated
by the principal case. Would it not, then, be advisable for every state
to adopt statutes similar to those in California ?21
1 DURWARD S. JONES
Deeds-Adverse Possession-Tacking-Strip of Land not Included in
Deed
For twenty years or more the successive occupants of two adjoining
tracts of land have been satisfied that the correct boundary between
their lands is a certain ditch, line, fence or hedgerow. Then deeds are
consulted, a physical survey is run, and one landowner realizes that he
is in possession of a strip of land not included in his deed, nor in the
deeds of his predecessors. Convinced that the land is rightfully his, he
claims title by adverse possession, only to be told that he has not held
19 CAL. Crv. CODE § 3343 (1949), Jacobs v. Levin, 58 Cal. App. 2d 913, 137
P. 2d 500 (1943); Horning v. Ferguson, 52 A. 2d 116 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App.
1947).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (1949), Thompson v. Modern School of Business
& Correspondence, 183 Cal. 112, 190 Pac. 451 (1920) ; District Motor Co. v.
Rodill, 88 A. 2d 489 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952).
2 The California Statute providing for the use of the "out of pocket" rule
states, "One defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property is entitled
to recover the difference between the actual value of that with which the de-
frauded person parted and the actual value of that which he received, together
with any additional damage arising from the particular transaction." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3343 (1949). The California Statute authorizing the assessment of puni-
tive damages is set out in note 14 supra. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (1949).
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the land long enough in his own right to satisfy the twenty year statutory
period in effect where land is held adversely without a deed.' He must
therefore attempt to show the requisite twenty years of adverse posses-
sion by tacking to his own the adverse possession of his predecessors.
The leading case on this point in North Carolina is Jennings v. White,2
where plaintiff and his two predecessors in possession, A and B, occu-
pied an entire lot, but under deeds in which the description omitted the
southwest corner. Plaintiff sought to establish title to this corner by
adverse possession, but in order to show the twenty years of adverse
possession required to ripen title where the land is held without color
of title, plaintiff had to tack to his own the adverse possession of A and
B. Plaintiff lost, the court holding that as a general rule jossession
could not be tacked to make out title by adverse possession when the
deed under which the last occupant claims title does not include the
land in dispute. This holding was based on plaintiff's failure to show
any privity in respect to the disputed corner between himself and his
predecessors in possession, the court declaring that in order to create
such privity there must have existed as between each successive holder
a relation such as ancestor and heir, grantor and grantee, or devisor
and devisee. Here the court found no such relationship in respect
to the controverted corner, but indicated instead that A, who took from
the plaintiff's remote grantor, was a tenant at will of the remote grantor.
Since A was only a tenant at will, his successors, B and the plaintiff,
presumably could hold no greater estate in the omitted strip of land
than a tenancy at will.3
In keeping with the rule as laid -down in Jennings v. White,4 the
North Carolina court in succeeding cases 5 has consistently refused to
allow a grantee to tack to his own the adverse possession of his grantor
of a strip of land not within the description of the deed. A slight
modification occurred in the recent case of Newkirk v. Porter,6 where
it was stated by way of dictum that a grantee who went into physical
possession of the strip not covered in the deed would become an ad-
verse possessor in his own right and not a tenant at will of his grantor,
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-40 (1943).2139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905).
In labeling A's possession a tenancy at will, the court apparently was in-
terpreting the statute of frauds as allowing only a tenancy at will in this type of
situation.
' 139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905).
'Newkirk v. Porter, 237 N. C. 115, 74 S. E. 2d 235 (1953); Locklear v.
Oxendine, 233 N. C. 710, 65 S. E. 2d 673 (1951) ; Simmons v. Lee, 230 N. C.
216, 53 S. E. 2d 79 (1949) ; Ramsey v. Ramsey, 229 N. C. 270, 49 S. E. 2d 476(1948) ; Boyce v. White, 227 N. C. 640, 44 S. E. 2d 49 (1947).
0237 N. C. 115, 74 S. E. 2d 235 (1953).
"This dictum is in accord with the holding in Blackstock v. Cole, 51 N. C.
560 (1859), the only North Carolina case in point prior to Jennings v. White,
139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905).
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but tacking of the preceding adverse possessions of the non-included
strip nevertheless would not be allowed.
Unlike North Carolina, most jurisdictions 8 hold that, while the
deed alone will not constitute the necessary privity as to the strip not
included in the deed, an express transfer of possession, or of possession
and claim, by grantor to grantee, is sufficient privity to ground the
tacking of their adverse possessions as to the strip not covered in the
deedY These courts apparently find that an express transfer of pos-
ession exists when the grantor indicates to the grantee boundaries which
include both the land described in the deed and the omitted strip and
then puts him in possession of both.10 The North Carolina court, on the
other hand, by not commenting on the circumstances surrounding the
transfer,1 has indicated that it gives no weight to the words and actions
of the parties at the time of the transfer. In none of the cases where
tacking of a strip not included in the 'deed was attempted has our court
determined that an express oral transfer of possession would constitute
sufficient privity.
The court in its decisions 12 has continually emphasized that in
North Carolina the privity sufficient to permit tacking of the non-
'Note, 17 A. L. R. 2d 1131 (1951).
' St. Louis S. W. R. R. v. Mulhey, 100 Ark. 71, 139 S. W. 643 (1911); Smith
v. Chapin, 31 Conn. 530 (1863); Dubois v. Karazin, 315 Mich. 598, 24 N. W.
2d 414 (1946); Vandell v. St. Martin, 42 Minn. 163, 44 N. W. 525 (1889);
Crowder v. Neal, 100 Miss. 730, 57 So. 1 (1911); Alukenis v. Kashulines, 96
N. H. 107, 70 A 2d 202 (1950) ; Helmich v. Davenport, 174 Iowa 558, 156 N. W.
736 (1916).
In these cases the transfer of possession was made by an express declaration
of transfer, or the practical equivalent thereof. In the last case tacking was
allowed even though successive deeds expressly excluded the controversial strip.
" St. Louis S. W. R. R. v. Mulhey, 100 Ark. 71, 139 S. W. 643 (1911), where
grantor represented as his own all the land within an inclosure and put grantee
into possession thereof; Gregory v. Thorrez, 277 Mich. 197, 269 N. W. 142 (1936),
where grantor put grantee into possession of entire tract, indicating hedge as
correct southern boundary, and hedge later turned out to be seven feet south of
correct boundary; Rembert v. Edmondson, 99 Tenn. 15, 41 S. W. 935 (1897),
when grantor cqnveyed to grantee all her interest in an adjacent strip which
both parties knew was not included in the description in the deed. Shuttles v.
Butcher, 1 S. W. 2d 661 (Tex. 1927), here fences on one side of tract were located
a few feet over onto the adjoining lot, and grantor represented as his own
everything that was under fence.
" The only instance where the court might be construed as having commented
on such circumstances appears in Jennings v. White, 139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799
(1905), when it was stated that if the grantor put the grantee into possession of
the entire lot, including the portion not covered in the deed, the grantee in respect
to that portion became the grantor's tenant at will. The court might have been
speaking hypothetically for the facts as reported do not affirmatively indicate
an express transfer.
2Newkirk v. Porter 237 N. C. 115, 74 S. E. 2d 235 (1953): Locklear v.
Oxendine, 233 N. C. 710, 65 S. E. 2d 673 (1951) ; Simmons v. Lee, 230 N. C. 216
53 S. E. 2d 79 (1949) ; Ramsey v. Ramsey. 229 N. C. 270, 49 S. E. 2d 47(1948) ; Boyce v. White, 227 N. C. 640, 44 S. E. 2d 49 (1947) ; Jennings v. White,
139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905) ; Blackstock v. Cole, 51 N. C. 560 (1859).
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included strip can be created only through a paper writing describing
the strip or by descent.
That an anomalous situation exists under the North Carolina rule
of Jennings v. White' 3 can be illustrated as follows: Suppose X, own-
ing no other land in the vicinity, adversely holds Blackacre, a small
strip, without any deed. In order to establish title to Blackacre by
adverse possession, X can tack to his own the prior adverse possession
of his predecessor in possession, since an express parol transfer by his
predecessor creates sufficient privity.14  Conversely, suppose X has
purchased a tract consisting of Whiteacre plus Blackacre, but he and
his grantor claim under a deed which does not include Blackacre in its
description. X cannot tack in order to establish ownership to Blackacre
by adverse possession, even though he and his grantor hold under a deed
which at the time of purchase they both thought included Blackacre
in its description; for in this case apparently the express oral transfer
of possession does not create sufficient privity.15 It would appear, then,
that while a grantee who in good faith purchases a tract of land, a strip
of which is not covered by his deed, cannot tack to his own the adverse
possession of his grantor to that strip, one who has purchased nothing
and has no deed but who has been put into adverse possession of this
same strip can tack to his own the adverse possession of his predecessor
and establish his title to the strip.
Since, in the very recent decision of Newkirk v. Porter,16 the court
has reiterated the harsh rule laid down in Jennings v. White,17 it would
seem futile to try to establish title by adverse possession to a strip of
land not included in the deed when it is necessary to tack in order to
show an adverse holding for the twenty years statutory period. It
should be noted, however, that in a Michigan case' 8 involving title to a
strip of land not included in his deed, while the court did not allow the
defendant to tack successive adverse possessions to the strip, he pre-
vailed on the theory of acquiescence. The court -declared that where
successive parties had accepted a line as the correct boundary and on
both sides had used up to the line and no further for a long period of
years, each party is estopped to deny the accepted line as the true line.
This theory of acquiescence might be tried in North Carolina, for our
' 139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905).
'* Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 172 N. C. 809, 812, 90 S. E. 993, 995 (1916) where
Justice Hoke stated, "In order to establish title by adverse occupation there must
be continuity of possession for the requisite statutory period, and, in case of suc-
cessive occupants, there must be some recognized connection between them. This
connection may be effected by deed or will or other writing, or it may be shown
by parol."
' See cases listed in note 11, supra.1c237 N. C. 115, 74 S. E. 2d 235 (1953).
17 139 N. C. 23, 51 S. E. 799 (1905).
" Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 209 N. W. 169 (1926).
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Court approved the doctrine in a previous case where a strip of land
not covered in the deed was the subject of the controversy.19
EARLE GENE RAMSEY
Divorce-Alimony-Permanent Alimony Incident to Absolute Divorce
The recent case of Feldman v. Feldman,' following close on the
heels of Livingston v. Livingston2 and involving the same procedural
question, once again explains the status of North Carolina law on the
subject of permanent alimony as an incident to an absolute divorce
decree. The plaintiff, husband, instituted an action for absolute di-
vorce on the grounds of two years' separation. Subsequent to the filing
of the complaint but prior to the decree for absolute 'divorce, the parties
made an agreement whereby the plaintiff was to pay the defendant a
monthly sum for the support of herself and the child of the marriage.
This agreement was entered as a consent order. Thereafter a decree
for absolute divorce was granted. Some years later the plaintiff ceased
to make the monthly payments. The defendant, after notice, moved that
the plaintiff be adjudged in contempt of court and the plaintiff moved to
strike the consent order. Upon hearing the plaintiff's motion, the lower
court relying on Livingston v. Livingston, supra, ruled that the consent
order was inoperative as an order of the court. The Supreme Court
in affirming the decision points out that the consent order (permanent
alimony) was not reduced to a court judgment or decree before the
commencement of the suit for absolute divorce and consequently did
not come within the protective provision of G. S. 50-11.3
"In Roman Catholic times, that is, until the reign of Henry VIII,
marriage was regarded by the church as a sacrament, and as therefore
indissoluble. This being the view of the canon law, it was applied by
the ecclesiastical court in England, which had jurisdiction over matri-
9 In Hanstein v. Ferrell, 149 N. C. 240, 62 S. E. 1070 (1908), ownership of a
narrow strip between two city lots was in question. The plaintiff and his pred-
ecessors in title and the defendant had both acquiesced in a boundary line
formed by a common trench caused by water dripping from the eaves of two
wooden buildings formerly on the premises. The court held that recognition of,
and acquiescence in a line as the true boundary line of one's land, not induced
by mistake, and contained through a considerable period of time, affords strong,
if not conclusive, evidence that the line so recognized is the true line.
1 236 N. C. 731, 73 S. E. 2d 865 (1952). In the even later case of Merritt v.
Merritt, 237 N. C. 271, 74 S. E. 2d 529 (1953), the same procedural point was
raised. There the husband and wife had consented to the continuance of a separa-
tion agreement for alimony after the absolute divorce which was then in suit.
The court citing the principal case held the alimony liability was contractual only
and could not be enforced by contempt as it had been decreed incident to the
absolute divorce rather than prior to the commencement of the said suit.
2235 N. C. 515, 70 S. E. 2d 480 (1952).
N . C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (1949, recompiled 1950).
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